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SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION OF ADVERSE INTERESTS:
SUING ONE CLIENT ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER
In re Dresser Industries, Inc.
972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992)
Edwin S. Gault, Jr.
"'No man can serve two masters.' "1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of In re Dresser Industries, Inc.,2 the Fifth Circuit faced its first case
involving a conflict of interest based on the simultaneous representation of clients
with adverse interests.' Addressing the motion to disqualify counsel, the court of-
fered a "rule of thumb": "However a lawyer's motives may be clothed, if the sole
reason for suing his own client is the lawyer's self-interest, disqualification should
be granted."'
This Note analyzes three aspects of the Dresser opinion: the substantive law (in-
cluding the American Bar Association's standards) addressing simultaneous rep-
resentation, the law governing a disqualification motion, and the appealability of a
disqualification order.'
1. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 E2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Matthew 6:24).
2. 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
3. Id. at 544.
4. Id. at 545.
5. The scope of the American Bar Association standards and federal case law survey is limited to conflicts of
interest based on a law firm's concurrent representation of two or more clients whose interests become adverse.
However, the analysis of the law governing disqualification motions and the appealability of such motions is not
limited to concurrent representation and is applicable to all disqualification motions.
For a discussion of simultaneous representation of two or more clients in the same proceeding or transaction,
see Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solu-
tion to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 TEX. L. REv. 211 (1982).
For a broader discussion of attorney conflicts of interest, see generally Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profes-
sion, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1244 (1981); Samuel R. Miller et al., Conflicts ofInterest in Corporate Litigation, 48 Bus.
LAW. 141 (1992); Gary S. Hess, Note, Disqualification of Attorneys and Their Firms for Conflicts of Interest: A
Lack of Consistency in Both Federal and State Courts, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 493 (1987); Bruce L. Silverstein, Note,
Attorney Disqualification for a Conflict of Interest in Federal Civil Litigation: A Confusing Body of Law in Need of
Organization, 30 VILL. L. REv. 463 (1985); Linda A. Winslow, Comment, Federal Courts and Attorney Disquali-
fication Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest, 62 WASH. L. REv. 863 (1987).
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II. FACTS OF Dresser
The Susman Godfrey law firm represented Dresser Industries, Inc. [hereinaf-
ter Dresser] in two pending lawsuits in Texas state court.6 While these two state
court actions were pending, Stephen Susman, a partner in the Susman Godfrey
firm, was named chairman of the plaintiffs' steering committee in a consolidated
antitrust class action brought against manufacturers of oil well drill bits.7 Susman
Godfrey informed Dresser of Stephen Susman's position in the class action and of
the possibility that Dresser would be joined as a defendant.8 Susman Godfrey of-
fered to assist in the transition to a new counsel if Dresser chose to replace them in
the two state court actions .' Dresser, however, chose not to remove the firm in ei-
ther case.°
Subsequently, Dresser was joined as a defendant in the drill bits class action. 1
Stephen Susman, as lead counsel for the plaintiffs' committee, signed the amended
complaint alleging antitrust violations by Dresser, his firm's own client.' 2 Dresser
then moved to disqualify Stephen Susman. 3 The motion to disqualify was based
on a conflict of interest stemming from Susman Godfrey's representation of
Dresser in the two pending state court actions.
The district court denied Dresser's motion to disqualify. 5 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted Dresser's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed
the district court to disqualify Stephen Susman and Susman Godfrey from further
representation of the plaintiffs in the class action. 16
6. Red Eagle Resources Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. CIV.A.H-91-0627, 1992 WL 170614, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1992) (order denying counsel disqualification), mandamus granted sub nom. In re Dresser
Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
The first case, Cullen Center, Inc. v. W R. Grace & Co., No. 90-01693 (295th Judicial District Court of Harris
County, Texas), involved property damage caused by asbestos fireproofing in three office buildings in Houston,
Texas. Red Eagle Resources, 1992 WL 170614, at * 1. Susman Godfrey jointly represented Cullen Center, Inc.,
Dresser-Cullen Venture, and Dresser Industries, Inc. as plaintiffs. Id.
The second case, CPS International, Inc. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., No. 88-46399 (334th Judicial District
Court of Harris County, Texas), was originally brought in federal court alleging violations of the Sherman Act
and tortious interference with CPS International's contract with a Saudi Arabian businessman. Id. The district
court granted Dresser's motion for summary judgment based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. CPS
International then filed suit in Texas state court without any allegations of antitrust violations. Id. at *2. Susman
Godfrey defended Dresser throughout the proceedings and had unlimited access to information related to
Dresser's organization, management practices, finances, and accounting procedures. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at
541. Furthermore, Susman Godfrey's lawyers discussed antitrust defenses with Dresser's in-house counsel. Id.
at 542.
7. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 541-42.
8. Id. at 542. Before the consolidation of the class, none of the individual lawsuits named Dresser as a de-
fendant. Red Eagle Resources, 1992 WL 170614, at *3.
9. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 542.
10. Id.
11. Id. The consolidated class action was styled Red Eagle Resources Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No.
CIV.A.H-91-0627. Id. at 541.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 542.
14. Red Eagle Resources Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. CIV.A.H-91-0627, 1992 WL 170614, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1992), mandamus granted sub nom. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540(5th Cir. 1992).
15. Red Eagle Resources, 1992 WL 170614, at *5.
16. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 546.
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III. SURVEY OF THE LAW
A. Ethical Standards of the American Bar Association
Adopted in 1908, the Canons of Professional Ethics were the first promulgation
of a standard of conduct by the American Bar Association.17 The Preamble to the
Canons states that a system of justice cannot be maintained "unless the conduct
and the motives of the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval
of all just men." 8 Canon 6"9 forbids a lawyer to represent conflicting interests un-
less all concerned expressly consent."0 According to this Canon, "a lawyer repre-
sents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for
that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."21 Although the language
does not specifically address concurrent representation, at least one court held
that a lawyer could not sue a present client under the Canons of Professional
Ethics. 22
As a replacement for the Canons, the American Bar Association adopted the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969 as a more specific set of stand-
ards governing attorney conduct.2 3 The Model Code contains Canons,24 Ethical
Considerations,25 and Disciplinary Rules26 as a set of principles to guide and gov-
ern attorney conduct.
The Model Code confronts concurrent representation in the Ethical Consider-
ations and Disciplinary Rules of Canon 5 which states: "A Lawyer Should
17. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 11 (University Casebook Series ed., 5th ed. 1991).
18. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS pmbl. (1967).
19. Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his rela-
tions to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the cli-
ent in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting inter-
ests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confi-
dences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters ad-
versely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1967).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964) (bringing suit against a present client is a
violation of the Preamble to the Canons of Professional Ethics).
23. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 17, at 12.
24. The Canons of the Model Code are "statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the stand-
ards of professional conduct expected of lawyers." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary
statement (1980).
25. The Ethical Considerations of the Model Code are "aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive." Id.
26. The Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code are "mandatory in character. . . . [and] state the minimum
level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action." Id.
1994]
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Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."27 Disciplinary
Rule 5-105 sets forth the Model Code test regarding concurrent representation.28
Under Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C), a lawyer can represent "differing interests"
only "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each [client],"
and each client consents after a full disclosure of the possible effects.29
In 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct as its third set of standards governing attorney conduct. Model
Rule 1.7 squarely addresses a lawyer suing a present client.3" Under this Rule, a
lawyer cannot represent "directly adverse" interests unless the lawyer "reasonably
believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship" with the
present client and "each client consents after consultation."31 The Comment32 to
Model Rule 1.7 explains that loyalty prohibits a lawyer from representing adverse
interests even if the matters are completely unrelated.33
27. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980). The Ethical Considerations addressing
concurrent representation are 5-1, 5-14, 5-15, 5-16, and 5-19. Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
01:323 (Supp. 1990).
28. Disciplinary Rule 5-105 states:
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the
Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional judg-
ment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered
employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another
client, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent per-
mitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is
obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation
after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Discipli-
nary Rule, no partner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or con-
tinue such employment.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980).
29. Id. at DR 5-105(C).
30. Model Rule 1.7 states:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with
the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
31. Id. at Rule 1.7(a).
32. The Comments to each Model Rule "are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is
authoritative." Id. at scope.
33. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt.
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B. Federal Case Law on Simultaneous Representation
Federal courts' disfavor of attorneys concurrently representing parties with ad-
verse interests can be traced back to the early nineteenth century. For example, in
Williams v. Reed34 the court, although dismissing the action against the attorney,
stated:
An attorney is bound to disclose to his client every adverse retainer, and even every
prior retainer, which may affect the discretion of the latter. No man can be supposed
to be indifferent to the knowledge of facts, which work directly on his interests, or
bear on the freedom of his choice of counsel. When a client employs an attorney, he
has a right to presume, if the latter be silent on the point, that he has no engagements,
which interfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the cause confided to
him; that he has no interest, which may betray his judgment, or endanger his fidel-
ity.3
In more recent years, many federal courts have addressed the conflicts of inter-
est that arise when a law firm simultaneously represents two or more parties with
adverse interests.
1. Disqualification Ordered
In Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc. ,36 a partner in the New York City law firm
representing the plaintiff was also a partner in a Buffalo law firm which repre-
sented the defendant in other litigation pending in a different district court.3 7 Find-
ing a conflict of interest, the district court disqualified the plaintiffs law firm.
3
1
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the decision to disqualify should be gov-
erned by the "substantial relationship" test.3 9 Noting that the "substantial relation-
ship" test applies only in actions involving former rather than present clients, the
court stated:
Under the Code, the lawyer who would sue his own client, asserting in justifica-
tion the lack of "substantial relationship" between the litigation and the work he has
undertaken to perform for that client, is leaning on a slender reed indeed. Putting it
as mildly as we can, we think it would be questionable conduct for an attorney to
participate in any lawsuit against his own client without the knowledge and consent
of all concerned.4"
34. 29 F. Cas. 1386 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,733) (attorney accused of fraudulently concealing adverse
retainer).
35. Id. at 1390.
36. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. Id. at 1385.
38. Id.
39. "The 'substantial relationship' test is ... customarily applied in determining whether a lawyer may accept
employment against a former client." Id. at 1386. A lawyer cannot accept employment against a former client if
the matter is substantially related to the previous representation. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605,
618 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993). See aLso T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 113 F Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.9 (1983).
40. Cinema 5, 528 F.2d at 1386.
1994]
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Affirming the disqualification of plaintiffs counsel, the court relied on attorney
loyalty41 and Ethical Considerations 5-142 and 5-14," 3 noting that it is "prima facie
improper" for an attorney to sue a present client."
In IBM v. Levin," the Third Circuit faced a classic case of concurrent represen-
tation involving completely unrelated matters. In this case, Levin sued IBM alleg-
ing violations of the Sherman Act and New Jersey state law.4 Both before and after
Levin filed suit, the law firm representing Levin also represented IBM in labor
relations matters which were completely unrelated to Levin's antitrust suit against
IBM.47 Although the law firm performed services for IBM on a fee basis rather
than on retainer and had no assignment from IBM when Levin's complaint was
filed, the court nevertheless found that IBM was a present client since the law firm
had performed services for IBM before and after the filing of Levin's action." Cit-
ing Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the
court affirmed the law firm's disqualification.49
When a law firm spans nationally or internationally with vast numbers of cli-
ents in multiple cities, the probability of accepting employment from parties
whose interests are directly adverse obviously increases. Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.50 illustrates this probability. This case involved the
Chicago and Washington offices of the Kirkland and Ellis law firm." Kirkland
and Ellis defended Westinghouse Electric Corporation [hereinafter Westinghouse]
in a consolidated breach of contract action involving uranium supplies.52 At the
same time, the firm represented the American Petroleum Institute in a lobbying
effort to defeat proposed legislation.5 3
41. "The propriety of this conduct must be measured not so much against the similarities in litigation, as
against the duty of undivided loyalty which an attorney owes to each of his clients." Id.
42. Ethical Consideration 5-1 states:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the
benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the
interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his
client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980).
43. Ethical Consideration 5-14 states:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance
or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a
client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have
differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
Id. at EC 5-14.
44. Cinema 5, 528 F.2d at 1387 (citing In re Kelly, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462 (N.Y. 1968)).
45. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
46. Id. at 274.
47. Id. at 276-77.
48. Id. at 281.
49. Id. at 282-83.
50. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
51. Westinghouse Elec., 580 F.2d at 1313-16.
52. Id. at 1313.
53. Id. The proposed legislation would break up oil companies vertically by separating their entities, and hor-
izontally by prohibiting ownership of alternative energy resources. Id.
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As an offshoot to the breach of contract action, the firm's Chicago office filed
an antitrust action on behalf of Westinghouse against twenty-nine companies al-
leging an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade in the uranium industry. 4 On the
same day, the firm's Washington office released a report to the American
Petroleum Institute which denied that the oil companies had restricted trade in the
uranium industry. 5 Thus, on the same day, the firm's Chicago office alleged
price-fixing in the Westinghouse action while the firm's Washington office con-
cluded the exact opposite in the report to the American Petroleum Institute. 6
Although the American Petroleum Institute was not named as a defendant in the
Westinghouse suit, three of its members, including Kerr-McGee Corporation,
were named in the complaint.5 7 All three American Petroleum Institute members
named in the complaint completed confidential questionnaires and returned them
to the law firm's Washington office.5 8 Reversing the district court, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals disqualified the law firm from further representation of
Westinghouse in the antitrust action unless the three American Petroleum Institute
members were dismissed.5 9 The court based its decision on an implied attorney-
client relationship between the firm's Washington office and the three members of
the American Petroleum Institute named in the Westinghouse complaint .61
Another situation that may provoke a conflict of interest is the merger of law
firms. In Picker International, Inc. v. Varian Associates, Inc. ,61 a conflict of inter-
est involving concurrent representation developed when the Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pouge [hereinafter Jones Day] law firm merged with the McDougall, Hersh &
Scott [hereinafter MHS] firm.62 Before the merger, Jones Day had a continuing
relationship with Picker International, Inc. [hereinafter Picker], and MHS with
Varian Associates, Inc. [hereinafter Varian].63 Jones Day represented Picker in
two patent infringement actions against Varian.' Although MHS did not represent
Varian in either of these actions, it did represent Varian in other pending litiga-
tion.65 MHS sought Varian's consent to the concurrent representation, but Varian
refused.66 Subsequently, MHS notified Varian that it was compelled under the
54. Id. at 1312-13.
55. Id. at 1314.
56. Id. at 1312.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1313.
59. Id. at 1321.
60. Id. at 1319-20. As an example of an implied attorney-client relation, the court cited Whiting Corp. v.
White Machinery Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977), in which a law firm represented the plaintiff and a corpo-
ration that owned 20% of the defendant's stock. See also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567
F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
61. 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
62. Id. at 579.
63. Id.
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Model Code of Professional Responsibility to withdraw from all representation. 7
Varian then moved to disqualify Jones Day in both actions, and both district courts
granted the motion. 68
The court of appeals addressed the question within the framework of Discipli-
nary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.6 9 As to the
firm's withdrawal from representing Varian, the court stated: "To allow the
merged firm to pick and choose which clients will survive the merger would vio-
late the duty of undivided loyalty that the firms owe each of their clients under
Disciplinary Rule 5-105."" If the clients with adverse interests refuse to consent to
concurrent representation, the court noted that the merged firm must follow
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 581.
70. Id. at 583.
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Disciplinary Rule 2-11071 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which
addresses the withdrawal of counsel. 72 The court then affirmed both disqualifica-
tions. 7
A testament to the blurred distinction between present and former clients,
EEOC v. Orson H. Gygi Co. 74 stands as a far-reaching application of the bar on
concurrent representation. In this case, two women filed sex discrimina-
tion charges against Orson H. Gygi Company [hereinafter Gygi] with the
71. Disciplinary Rule 2-110 states:
DR 2-110 Withdrawal from Employment.
(A) In general.
(1) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not withdraw from employment in a proceeding before that tribunal without its permission.
(2) In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to
avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing
time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is
entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.
(3) A lawyer who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance
that has not been earned.
(B) Mandatory Withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its rules, shall with-
draw from employment, and a lawyer representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employ-
ment, if:
(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client is bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or as-
serting a position in the litigation, or is otherwise having steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of
harassing or maliciously injuring any person.
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary
Rule.
(3) His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult ftr him to carry out the employ-
ment effectively.
(4) He is discharged by his client.
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending
befbre a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is be-
cause:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
(b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.
(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the Dis-
ciplinary Rules.
(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out his employment ef-
fectively.
(e) Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary
to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees.
(2) His continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests of the client likely will be
served by withdrawal.
(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively.
(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to termination of his employment.
(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the
existence of other good cause for withdrawal.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1980).
72. Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
73. Id. at 584.
74. 749 F 2d 620 (1Oth Cir. 1984).
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EEOC.' 5 Thereafter, the attorney for Gygi met with the EEOC in mediation ef-
forts which ultimately ceased.7"
After the mediation efforts failed, one of the women alleging sex discrimination
retained Gygi's attorney to represent her in an annulment matter."7 Their attorney-
client relationship continued until the annulment became final.7" Several months
later, the EEOC filed suit against Gygi alleging sex discrimination in its hiring
practices.79 Although the woman represented by Gygi's attorney was not a named
party in the suit, she had initiated the claim and would benefit from the EEOC's
prevailing.80
The possible conflict of interest remained unknown to the parties and the law-
yers for many months." When the EEOC discovered the concurrent representa-
tion, it moved to disqualify Gygi's attorney because he simultaneously represented
the two parties without obtaining their consent.8 2 Although the conciliation efforts
with the EEOC had ceased before the woman retained the attorney and the annul-
ment proceedings had ended before the EEOC filed suit, the court, nevertheless,
determined that the lawyer had simultaneously represented adverse clients.8 3 Cit-
ing Canon 5 and Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, the court affirmed the district court's disqualification."
A law firm's representation of a trade or other association can trigger a conflict
of interest when the firm sues an association member. Facing this problem in
Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc. ,85 the Second Circuit added an interesting twist to
the usual inquiry. In this case, Glueck alleged that he was discharged by Jonathan
Logan, Inc. [hereinafter Logan] in breach of his employment contract . The law
firm representing Glueck also represented the Apparel Manufacturers Associa-
tion, Inc., a trade association with more than one hundred members.7 One of the
Association's members was R & K Originals, a division of Logan, the defendant in
Glueck's suit.' R & K Originals' President served as the Executive Vice-president
of the Association and a member of its negotiating committee. 9 Pursuant to his
75. Id. at 620.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. During the annulment proceeding, the woman assumed her maiden name. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 622.
81. Id. at 620-21.
82. Id. at 621.
83. Id. The court reasoned that the discrimination charges "remained alive" when the woman retained Gygi's
counsel in the annulment matter. Id.
84. Id. at 622.
85. 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
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duties with the trade Association, R & K Originals' President met with members
of Glueck's law firm in regard to labor matters."
Thus, the issue facing the Second Circuit was whether Logan was a present cli-
ent of Glueck's law firm by virtue of R & K Originals' membership in the trade
Association. 1 The court distinguished the situation when a law firm represents
adverse parties who are both clients in the "traditional sense" from the present situ-
ation when the adverse party is only a "vicarious" client by virtue of membership
in a trade association.92 The court then concluded that the "substantial relation-
ship" test93 is proper when deciding disqualification motions in actions brought by
an association's law firm against an association member."4 Since the law firm's du-
ties for the trade association and Glueck's action both involved labor matters, the
"substantial relationship" test was satisfied, thus requiring the firm's disqualifica-
tion .
2. Disqualification Motion Denied
Upon a finding of concurrent representation of adverse parties, some federal
courts have nevertheless refused to disqualify the law firm. In Unified Sewerage
Agency v. Jelco, Inc., the Ninth Circuit faced a dispute between a prime contrac-
tor and two subcontractors for a sewer plant project.97 The prime contractor, Jelco,
Inc. [hereinafter Jelco], sought to retain a law firm in regard to a controversy with
the electrical subcontractor.98 The law firm, however, represented the concrete
subcontractor in a dispute with Jelco also arising from the sewer plant project. 99
The law firm advised Jelco of the possible conflict of interest as the dispute with
the concrete subcontractor might ripen into a lawsuit, but Jelco, nevertheless, re-
tained the law firm.1"' After the settlement negotiations between Jelco and the
concrete subcontractor collapsed, the law firm asked Jelco to re-evaluate the con-
flict of interest. 101 Jelco decided to keep the law firm as counsel in the dispute with
90. Id.
91. Id. The court noted that in the Second Circuit disqualification is "granted only when a violation of the
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility poses a significant risk of trial taint." Id. (citing Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F2d 433, 444-46 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 449 U.S.
1106 (1981); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979)). However, "[tihat risk is encoun-
tered when an attorney represents one client in a suit against another client, in violation of Canon 5." Id. (citing
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976)).
92. Id. at 749. As an analogy, the court noted that a law firm representing the American Bar Association
would not have to decline to represent a client who was injured by an automobile driven by a member of that
Association. Id.
93. See supra note 39.
94. Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746, 749-50 (2d Cir. 1981).
95. Id. at 750.
96. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 1342.
98. Id. at 1343.
99. Id. at 1342-43.
100. Id. at 1343.
101. Id.
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the electrical subcontractor regardless of the firm's representation of the concrete
subcontractor.'12
Both actions eventually ripened into lawsuits. 10 3 Thus, the law firm was de-
fending Jelco in the action brought by the electrical subcontractor and also suing
Jelco on behalf of the concrete subcontractor.0 4 After the liability issues were de-
termined adversely to Jelco in the electrical subcontractor case, Jelco discharged
the law firm. 05 Jelco then moved to disqualify the firm in the action with the con-
crete subcontractor. 
106
The court found that Jelco had consented to the dual representation as required
by Disciplinary Rule 5-105.1'7 Refusing to disqualify the law firm, the court
stated: "We think the Code strikes a balance on the side of an individual's right to
choose his own counsel and against a per se rule forbidding multiple representa-
tion."108
Also addressing the issue of client consent, Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining &
Smelting Co.109 involved an action by Gould, Inc. [hereinafter Gould] against,
among others, Pechiney.110 Pechiney moved to disqualify Gould's counsel alleging
two independent conflicts of interest. 111 First, the law firm of Jones Day, who rep-
resented Gould against Pechiney, also represented Pechiney in patent matters. 
112
Rejecting Pechiney's argument that it only consented to Jones Day's position as lo-
cal counsel for Gould, the court refused to disqualify Jones Day:
Although the term "local counsel" at one time may have meant less responsibility on
the part of attorneys so designated, it is clear to the court, and should be to every
lawyer who litigates in this country, that in the last ten years developments in the law
have invalidated this prior meaning. The trend is, properly, away from the view that
some counsel have only limited responsibility and represent a client in court in a lim-
ited capacity, or that the local counsel is somewhat less the attorney for the client
than is lead counsel.
113
Pechiney, however, also alleged a separate conflict of interest stemming from






107. Id. at 1345-46.
108. Id. at 1350.
109. 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
110. Id. at 1122.
111.Id. at 1122-24.
112. Id. at 1122. The law firm of MHS had represented Pechiney in patent matters. Id. When MHS merged
with Jones Day, a conflict arose as Jones Day was local counsel for Gould in the action against Pechiney. Id. at
1122-23. Pechiney, however, consented to Jones Day's adverse representation. Id. at 1123. Thereafter, Gould
moved to replace the lead counsel with Jones Day, and upon no objections, the court granted the motion. Id.
113. Id. at 1125. But cf Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F Supp. 468 (D. Utah 1986) (appar-
ently relying on local counsel's limited duties).
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subsidiary of Pechiney, in unrelated matters.1 14 Preliminarily, the court found that
Jones Day's concurrent representation of Gould and a subsidiary of Pechiney was a
conflict of interest under Disciplinary Rule 5-105." ' As no consent was forthcom-
ing, 116 the court found Jones Day in violation of the prohibition against simultane-
ously representing parties with directly adverse interests.' 17
Although finding a violation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105, the court refused to
take a "mechanical approach"1"' and denied the motion to disqualify.119 However,
the court ordered Jones Day to discontinue its representation of either Gould or
IGT. 
120
In obvious disregard of an attorney's duty of loyalty to a client, Tipton v.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce121 stands for the proposition that a law firm
can avoid future disqualification by withdrawing from representation of the less
desired client. 122 In this case, Tipton was discharged as bank manager and thereaf-
ter brought suit. 121 When Tipton filed suit against the bank, she was represented by
an attorney in the bank's retained law firm in an ongoing but unrelated property
dispute. 124 The law firm discovered the conflict and withdrew its representation of
Tipton in the property dispute.
12
1
114. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F Supp. 1121, 1124 (N.D. Ohio 1990). Pechiney
acquired IGT four years after Gould filed suit and two years after it consented to Jones Day's representation of
Gould. Id. at 1123. Jones Day represented IGT before and after the acquisition. Id.
115. Id. at 1125.
116. The court refused to imply Pechiney's earlier consent to a conflict that arose two years later. Id. at 1126.
117. Id.
118. The court noted:
The explosion of merger activity by corporations during the past fifteen years, and the corresponding
increase in the possibility that attorney conflicts of interest may arise unexpectedly, make it appropriate
for a court to adopt a perspective about the disqualification of counsel in ongoing litigation that conforms
to the problem. This means taking a less mechanical approach to the problem, balancing the various inter-
ests. The result is that the courts are less likely to order disqualification and more likely to use other, more
tailored measures to protect the interests of the public and the parties.
Id.
119. Id. The court reasoned that Pechiney had not been prejudiced, and that disqualification would delay the
litigation. Id. at 1126-27. Furthermore, the court recognized that Pechiney created the conflict by acquiring
IGT. Id. at 1127.
120. Id. The court acknowledged other cases which prohibit "dropping one client for another" to avoid con-
flicts. Id. See Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also supra notes 61-73
and accompanying text. However, the court distinguished this case because Pechiney, not Jones Day, created the
conflict of interest. Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 E Supp. 1121, 1127 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
121. 872 F.2d 1491 (llth Cir. 1989).
122. Id. at 1498. But see Picker Int'l, 869 F.2d at 583 ("To allow the merged firm to pick and choose which
clients will survive the merger would violate the duty of undivided loyalty that firms owe each of their clients
under [Disciplinary Rule] 5-105."); Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir.
1981) ("challenged attorney could always convert a present client into a 'former client' by choosing when to cease
to represent the disfavored client"); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534,
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Clearly, no court should condone such conduct; it smacks of disloyalty where loyalty is
owed ....").
123. Tipton, 872 F.2d at 1492. Tipton alleged sex discrimination, retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, in-
terference with a contractual relationship, and fraudulent conduct. Id.
124. Id. at 1498.
125. Id.
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When Tipton moved to disqualify the bank's law firm for simultaneously repre-
senting parties with directly adverse interests, the attorney previously involved in
the property dispute submitted an affidavit stating that she had never discussed the
case with any lawyer in the firm except as identified in the affidavit.126 With al-
most no discussion and apparently relying on the affidavit, the court affirmed the
district court's denial of disqualification.' 27
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. ,'28 the court allowed
a law firm to cure a conflict of interest by firing a member of the firm. 12 9 In this
action, an attorney in the Boston office of the law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby &
MacRae represented R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company [hereinafter Reynolds To-
bacco] in ongoing products liability litigation. 3° Roughly eighteen months after
the firm's Boston office began representing Reynolds Tobacco, the firm's New
York office filed suit on behalf of long-time client, The Hartford, against RJR Na-
bisco, Inc. [hereinafter RJR Nabisco], the parent corporation of Reynolds To-
bacco. 31 Subsequently, the firm terminated the partner involved with Reynolds
Tobacco. 32 RJR Nabisco moved to disqualify the firm based on the firm's simul-
taneous representation of The Hartford and Reynolds Tobacco."'
Preliminarily, the court determined that the firm's attorney-client relationship
with Reynolds Tobacco extended to RJR Nabisco. 34 Noting the difference be-
tween suing a continuing and a former client,1 35 the court stated that the firm's re-
lationship with RJR Nabisco should not be considered continuing, although it
was continuing when Hartford filed suit.136 Refusing to employ a mechanical
126. Id. at 1499. The remainder of the firm's attorneys attested that they had received no confidential informa-
tion from the representation in the property dispute. Id.
127. Id.
128. 721 F Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
129. Id. at 540.
130. Id. at 536. The attorney represented Reynolds Tobacco prior to joining the firm. Id.
131. Id. at 536-37. The suit challenged the leveraged buy-out of RJR Nabisco. Id. at 537. The court noted that
no attorney involved in the Hartford case ever participated in any matter related to Reynolds Tobacco. Id. at 536.
132. Id. at 537. Although the attorney objected to the Hartford representation, the stated reason for termination
was the downgrading of the Boston office. Id.
133. Id. at 535.
134. Id. at 540.
135. "'[W]here the relationship is a continuing one, adverse representation is prima facie improper. .. '"Id.
at 539 (quoting Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976)) (alteration in original).
However, "where the alleged conflict relates to a former client, disqualification is warranted only where there is a
substantial relationship between the subject matters of the representation." Id.
136. Id. at 539-40. RJR Nabisco argued that the "substantial relationship" test was improper because any firm
could convert a present client into a former client by withdrawing from representation. Id. at 540. The court dis-
tinguished this case because it did not involve "a client abandoned by its counsel" or any "practical threats" to RJR
Nabisco. Id. at 541. But cf Miller, supra note 5, at 187 & n.270 (noting that many courts determine status-
whether a present or a former client-by the filing of the complaint rather than the disqualification motion).
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application of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,137 the court denied
the motion to disqualify the firm, distinguishing the case as one not involving "a
client abandoned by its counsel."138
Some view the prohibition against representing adverse interests as an incentive
for corporations to "taint shop"-i.e., parcel business among many law firms as a
means of preventing the firm from representing clients with interests adverse to
the corporation. 139
The taint shopping scenario apparently influenced the court's decision in SWS
Financial FundA v. Salomon Bros. 140 In this case, the plaintiffs, seven limited part-
nerships and corporations, sued Salomon Bros. alleging securities and antitrust
violations.141 The law firm of Schiff, Hardin, and Waite [hereinafter Schiff
Hardin) represented the plaintiffs.4 2 Salomon Bros., however, had previously re-
tained the Schiff Hardin firm in regard to commodities trading."'
When the plaintiffs filed suit, Schiff Hardin had not performed any work for
Salomon Bros. for five months, but they remained in contact.'" The court never-
theless concluded that Salomon Bros. was a present client of the firm.145 The court
stated that "Salomon [Bros.] was entitled to 'assume' that Schiff [Hardin] would
continue to be its lawyer on a continuing basis."'46 Furthermore, "Schiff [Hardin]
had the . . . responsibility for clearing up any doubt as to whether the client-
lawyer relationship persisted."147
Although finding a violation of Model Rule 1.7, the court refused to disqualify
Schiff Hardin.1' I Acknowledging that the "decision may be viewed by some as a
departure from the norm,"149 the court opted for the pragmatic approach, ex-
pounding on the risks of taint shopping:
137. In the court's words:
Under such circumstances, it seems to this Court that only a wooden application of the [American Bar
Association] canons would support disqualification. In this day of frequent firm reorganizations and lat-
eral transfers, such an application would merely invite an increased number of disqualification motions,
born of little more than hardball litigation strategy sessions and advanced where there is no threat of ac-
tual prejudice.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
138. Id. at 542. The court stated:
So long as there is no showing of a substantial similarity between the matters being litigated and those
handled in the past for the former client, so long as there is no showing of even the potential for actual
prejudice against the former client, and so long as the former client retains access to its prior counsel -
precisely the situation here-then there is no reason to disqualify any counsel.
Id. at 541.
139. See Anne M. Rossheim, Simultaneous Representation: Cracks Begin to Appear in Per Se Disqualification
Rule, 11 No. 13 OF COUNSEL 5 (1992).
140. 790 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
141. Id. at 1393.
142. Id. at 1394.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1395.
145. Id. at 1398.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1403.
149. Id.
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Clients of enormous size and wealth, and with a large demand for legal services,
should not be encouraged to parcel their business among dozens of the best law firms
as a means of purposefully creating the potential for conflicts. With simply a minor
"investment" of some token business, such clients would in effect be buying an insur-
ance policy against that firm's adverse representation.' 50
C. The Law Governing Motions to Disqualify15
In deciding (or reviewing) motions to disqualify counsel, federal courts have
given varied treatment to the rules of decision, the law governing the motion.
United States v. Walsh,1"2 a criminal case, involved differing standards in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Rules as amended by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. 5 3 In this RICO 54 prosecution, the government moved to
disqualify defense counsel based on a conflict of interest."55 The government con-
tended that the district court's local rules 56 incorporated the New Jersey Supreme
Court's amendments."5 7 The court held that the local rules incorporate only the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct without amendment by the New Jersey
Supreme Court. 58 The court further noted that the " 'supervision of the profes-
sional conduct of attorneys practicing in a federal court is a matter of federal
law.' ,159
Some district courts, however, specifically adopt the code of conduct of the
state bar or state supreme court as their ethical standards without reference to the
American Bar Association standards. In Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc. ,60
the district court adopted in its local rules the code of ethics of the Oregon State
150. Id. at 1402.
151. The application of this section is not limited to disqualification motions based on simultaneous represen-
tation; it extends to all federal disqualification motions based on a conflict of interest.
152. 699 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.J. 1988).
153. Id. at 471-72.
154. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
155. Walsh, 699 F. Supp. at 470-71. The alleged conflict stemmed from a member of the defense counsel's law
firm who previously worked for the Department of Justice supervising activities closely related to the case
against the defendant. Id. at 470.
156. Local Rule 6 provides: "'The Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct of theAmer-
ican BarAssociation shall govern the conduct of the Judges and the members of the bar admitted to practice in this
Court.'"Id. at 471 (quoting D.N.J. Gen. R. 6) (emphasis added).
157. Id. The defendant contended that the district court was not bound by any one rule, but rather that the deci-
sion was a matter of federal law. Id.
The difference in the American Bar Association and New Jersey rules was important in two ways. First, the
New Jersey rule contained an "appearance of impropriety" standard in addition to the American Bar Associa-
tion's "personal and substantial participation" standard. Id. at 471-72. Second, the American Bar Association
rules permitted screening former government attorneys to avoid disqualification of the entire firm, but the New
Jersey rules imputed disqualification throughout the firm. Id. at 472.
158. Id. at 471. The decision rested on the federal statute governing local rulemaking authority, 28 U.S.C. §
2071 (1988), and the clear language of the local rules. Id. at 472-74.
159. Id. at 473 (quoting United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1980)). Cf IBM v. Levin, 579
F.2d 271, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978) ("It seems clear that the conduct of practitioners before the federal courts must
be governed by the rules of those courts rather than those of the state courts.").
160. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Bar.161 The Ninth Circuit apparently rejected the argument that state law con-
trolled: "'[W]e do not think that the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins compels
the federal courts to permit, in proceedings before those courts, whatever action
by an attorney-at-law may be sanctioned by the courts of the state."' 162 Noting the
similarities in Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the Oregon Code and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, the circuit court employed American Bar Association
opinions and authority from several jurisdictions adopting the Model Code.163
In contrast to the Jelco Court's position on state ethics law, Image Technical
Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 164 held that California law must be applied to
a disqualification motion. 161 In this case, the district court, in its local rules,
adopted as its code of ethics the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of
California. 16 6 Rejecting both of the plaintiff s arguments as to the inapplicability of
the California Rules,167 the court disqualified the law firm.168
The far-reaching possibilities of Eastman Kodak injecting state ethics law into
federal courts are somewhat undercut by Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 169 an
earlier case also arising in the Northern District of California. 170 Although the dis-
trict court's local rules adopted the California Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Federal Circuit nevertheless reviewed the disqualification under Ninth Circuit
law.' This was important because the California Rules, unlike the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, did not provide for imputed disqualification of the law
firm.172 Affirming the disqualification, the court stated that the American Bar
161. Id. at 1342 n.1.
162. Id. (quoting Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516,524 (9th Cir. 1964)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
But see Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 820 E Supp. 1212, 1216 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(noting that the Jelco Court expressly declined to decide which law applied).
163. Jelco, 646 F2d at 1342 n. 1. Cf Bodily v. Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D.
Utah 1986) (district court's local rule adopting Utah Code of Professional Responsiblity "incorporates both the
state and national codes of professional responsibility and makes both binding upon counsel before this court").
164. 820 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
165. Id. at 1215. Accord Graham v. Wyeth Lab. Div. ofAm. Home Prods. Corp., 906 F2d 1419, 1423 (10th
Cir. 1990) (Kansas case law controls); Uhlrig v. Harder, No. 93-1009-PFK, 1993 WL 246006, at *1 (D. Kan.
1993) (order denying disqualification motion) (Kansas case law controls). But see County of Suffolk v. Long Is-
land Lighting Co., 710 F Supp. 1407, 1413-14 (E. D.N.Y. 1989) ("A federal court is not bound to enforce New
York's view of what constitutes ethical professional conduct."), affd, 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); Figueroa-
Olmo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 616 F Supp. 1445, 1450 (D.P.R. 1985) ("Although reference to how the
supreme court, of a district where the federal court sits, applies its code of professional conduct is helpful, the
resolution of problems of this nature . . . is a matter of federal law . . . .") (citation omitted); Black v. Missouri,
492 F. Supp. 848, 874-75 (D. Mo. 1980) (federal court's ethical determination contrary to state bar ethics opin-
ion).
166. Eastman Kodak, 820 F Supp. at 1215.
167. The first argument rested on the inapplicability of the California Rules because the law firm in question
only participated in briefs to the United States Supreme Court. Id. The second argument, based onJelco, sought a
federal standard for disqualification motions. Id. at 1216.
168. Id. at 1218.
169. 847 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
170. Id. at 828.
171. Id. at 829. Accord Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 869 E2d 578,580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (dis-
qualification reviewed under the law of the regional circuit where an appeal from the district court would nor-
mally lie).
172. Atasi, 847 F2d at 830.
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Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility "as applied in court deci-
sions" was "binding on the lawyers practicing before the Northern District" of
California.' 73
Other court decisions have approached a federal common law of ethics rely-
ing on the court's inherent or supervisory powers to control the litigation
proceedings."74 Although involving an attorney suspension rather than disqualifi-
cation, In re Snyder 7 ' provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to address
federal courts' inherent powers. The Snyder Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's
statement that the conduct expected of an attorney was defined by the standards
adopted by the state licensing authority.'76 Hinting at a federal common law stand-
ard, the Court stated: "The state code of professional responsibility does not by its
own terms apply to sanctions in the federal courts. Federal courts admit and sus-
pend attorneys as an exercise of their inherent power; the standards imposed are a
matter of federal law.'
'1 7 7
D. Appealability of a Motion to Disqualify Counsel
178
Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows appeals only from "fi-
nal decisions" of a district court.179 This section precludes an appeal until there has
been "a decision by the [d]istrict [clourt that 'ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' "180 This prohibition
"emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge," which
would be undermined by permitting piecemeal appeals.' 8' Furthermore, the
173. Id. For its decision, the court relied on the district court's local rule which adopted the California Rules
and "'decisions of any court applicable' to 'standards of professional conduct."' Id. (quoting Paul E. Iacono Struc-
tural Eng'r, Inc. v. Humphrey, 722 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983)). Cf Bodily v.
Intermountain Health Care Corp., 649 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D. Utah 1986) (district court's local rule adopting
Utah Code of Professional Responsibility "incorporates both state and national codes").
174. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The district court's power to dis-
qualify an attorney derives from its inherent authority to supervise the professional conduct of attorneys appear-
ing before it."); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("The power of this court to
disqualify lawyers is based on the court's general supervisory powers, and questionable behavior will not be per-
mitted merely because it is not directly covered by the Canons.") (footnote omitted); cf Chambers v. Nasco, 501
U.S. 32, 41 (1991) (The district court's imposition of sanctions outside the realm of Rule 11 was permissible
because the court's "inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses.").
175. 472 U.S. 634 (1985).
176. Id. at 645 n.6.
177. Id. (citing Hertz v. United States, 18 F.2d 52, 54-55 (8th Cir. 1927)).
178. The application of this section is not limited to disqualification motions based on simultaneous represen-
tation; it extends to all federal disqualification motions based on a conflict of interest.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in
sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
180. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,
233 (1945)).
181. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
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finality requirement of § 1291 promotes efficient judicial administration by
"avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the
harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to
which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment."182
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a limited exception to the finality
requirement of § 1291 in what has become known as the "collateral order"
doctrine.183 In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Court found that the
district court's decision1" fell "in that small class [of decisions] which finally de-
termine[s] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated. "'1 Thus, the Court held the decision appealable as a "final disposition of a
claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require
consideration with it."
186
Following the Cohen decision, many courts of appeals found that orders grant-
ing or denying motions to disqualify counsel were within the "collateral order" ex-
ception to § 1291 187 The Supreme Court, however, has effectively halted this
practice. 188
Although the grant or denial of a motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable
under § 1291, the party losing the motion may seek a writ of mandamus'89 from
the court of appeals.190 The Supreme Court has characterized the writ of manda-
mus as a "drastic" remedy that should be issued "only in extraordinary situa-
tions ."'91 A party seeking a writ of mandamus must show no other adequate
182. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
183. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
184. The district court's decision denied the defendant's motion to direct the plaintiff and the intervenor to post
a security bond as required by a New Jersey statute. Id. at 545.
185. Id. at 546.
186. Id. at 546-47. More recently, the Court stated that in order to fall within the "collateral order" doctrine,
"the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate
from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment." Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (footnote omitted).
187. For a discussion of the checkered history of the treatment of disqualification motions within the collateral
order doctrine, see United States v. Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1110-12 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983); Community Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
188. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985) (order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is
not a collateral order subject to immediate appeal); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (order dis-
qualifying counsel in a criminal prosecution is not a collateral order subject to immediate appeal); Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (order denying disqualification motion in a civil case is not a
collateral order subject to immediate appeal).
189. The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, states:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice orjudge of a court which has jurisdic-
tion.
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
190. See Risjord, 449 U.S. at 378 n. 13 (noting mandamus availability "in the exceptional circumstances for
which it was designed").
191. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (citations omitted).
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means of obtaining the desired relief. 192 Furthermore, the right to the writ must be
"'clear and indisputable.' 1 93 Concerning the availability of the extraordinary writ,
the Supreme Court stated: "What never? Well, hardly ever!" '194
The use of mandamus to review disqualification motions has received varied
treatment in the courts of appeals. Some courts have granted the writ, 195 generally
relying on the satisfaction of the two-pronged test: no other adequate means of ob-
taining relief, and a clear and indisputable right to the writ.196 While the second
prong (clear and indisputable right) is substantive, addressing the merits of the dis-
trict court's decision, the first prong (no other adequate means of obtaining relief)
is procedural and requires the court of appeals to find that appellate review after
final judgment is not adequate. 197
Other courts of appeals have refused to issue a writ of mandamus in regard to
disqualification motions.198 Of these decisions, a predominant reason for denying
the writ is the opportunity for review on appeal after final judgment. 19 9 However,
mandamus might be available if the party can "'demonstrate that something about
the order, or its circumstances, would make an end-of-case appeal ineffectual or
leave legitimate interests unduly at risk.' "200
The Seventh Circuit in In re Sandahl"1 distilled the confusing mandamus anal-
ysis into a different inquiry: whether the disqualification order is patently errone-
ous. 212 Recognizing the difficulty in resolving whether there is no other adequate
means of relief (irreparable harm), 203 the court noted the importance of the second
192. Id. at 35 (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); Roche v. Evaporated Milk
Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21,26 (1943)).
193. Id. (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (quoting United States ex
rel Bernardin v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899))).
194. Id. at 36.
195. See, e.g., In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1992); In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993); In re American Cable Publications, Inc., 768 F.2d 1194 (10th
Cir. 1985).
196. See, e.g., American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 608-09;American Cable Publications, 768 F.2d at 1195.
197. See American Airlines, 972 F.2d at 608-09. But cf Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424,438
(1985) (noting that absent a requirement of prejudice, a disqualification order can be effectively reviewed on
appeal after final judgment); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 376 (1981) (noting that an
order denying disqualification can be effectively reviewed on appeal after final judgment).
198. See, e.g., In re Mechem, 880 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Bushkin Assocs., Inc., 864 F.2d 241 (1st
Cir. 1989); Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 856 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Ford
Motor Co., 751 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1984).
199. See, e.g., Mechem, 880 F.2d at 874; Bushkin, 864 F.2d at 243; Ford Motor, 751 F.2d at 275-76. But cf
Merle Norman Cosmetics, 856 F2d at 101-02 (finding no other adequate means of relief, but denying writ be-
cause order was not clearly erroneous).
200. Bushkin, 864 F.2d at 243 (quoting In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1005-06 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Cf Community Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("In the exceptional case,
where irreparable harm would indeed result, the movant may petition this court for a writ of mandamus . .
201. 980 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1992).
202. Id. at 1121.
203. The difficulty turns on whether the party losing the disqualification motion, on appeal after final judg-
ment, would have to show that a different outcome would have resulted with a different set of lawyers. Id. at
1119. The Supreme Court stated in Koller that prejudice has never been required to reverse a final judgment due
to an erroneous disqualification motion, but specifically left the question open. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Kol-
ler, 472 U.S. 424,438 (1985).
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prong of the mandamus test -clear and indisputable right to the writ.20 4 However,
the court stated that some courts of appeals have allowed mandamus to become
"functionally identical to direct appeal" because disqualification orders raise legal
issues which receive little deference from appellate courts.2"' Therefore, in order
"[t]o avoid the collapse of mandamus into appeal," the court held that a party
seeking mandamus must show that the disqualification order was "patently erro-
neous."206
Another possible avenue of appeal is to seek certification of the disqualification
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 2 7 As the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged this route, 208 and some courts of appeals have employed it, 20 9 the certifica-
tion process is a viable avenue of immediate appeal for a party losing a
disqualification motion.
IV. In re Dresser Industries, Inc.
When Dresser was joined as a defendant in the drill bits class action, it moved to
disqualify Stephen Susman and Susman Godfrey as plaintiffs' counsel.210
Dresser's motion rested on the fact that Stephen Susman, chairman of the plain-
tiffs' steering committee in the class action, was a partner in the Susman Godfrey
law firm which currently represented Dresser in two pending state court
actions.211 In the class action, Dresser was charged by its own lawyers, Susman
Godfrey, with fraudulently concealing a conspiracy to fix prices of drill bits.212
Addressing the motion to disqualify, the district court determined that
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct "wholly" governed the
204. Sandahl, 980 F.2d at 1121.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) states:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section,
shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals
which would have jurisdiciton of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, [t]hat application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district
court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
208. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 435 (1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n. 13 (1981).
209. See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988); Atasi Corp. v.
Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Waters v. Kemp, 845 F.2d 260 (1 th Cir. 1988); cf Kenne-
cott Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 873 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying mandamus on the ground that the
question should be certified under § 1292(b) to the Federal Circuit). But see Shurance v. Planning Control Int'l,
Inc., 839 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988) (order denying counsel disqualification does not meet the requirements of
§ 1292(b)); United States v. White, 743 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1984) (certification under § 1292(b) is not applicable
to criminal proceedings).
210. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1992).
211. Red Eagle Resources Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. CIV.A.H-91-0627, 1992 WL 170614, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1992) (order denying counsel disqualification), mandamus grunted sub nom. Dresser Indus.,
972 F.2d at 540.
212. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 541.
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decision.213 This reasoning was based on the district court's local rules, which
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility of the State Bar of Texas as the
district's rules of conduct.21 The district court found that Texas Rule 1.06(b)215 al-
lows concurrent representation of adverse interests except when the representa-
tions involve a substantially related matter or one representation reasonably
appears to become adversely limited by responsibilities to other clients.216 The
court then concluded that Susman Godfrey had not violated Texas Rule 1.06(b)(1)
because the two pending state court actions were not substantially related, legally
or factually, to the class action.2"7 Further, the court found no violation of Texas
Rule 1.06(b)(2), as the representation of the class action plaintiffs did not reasona-
bly appear to become adversely limited by the representation of Dresser in the
218state court actions.
Because the district court's denial of the motion to disqualify Stephen Susman
was not an appealable collateral order under § 1291,219 Dresser petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.
220
Preliminarily, the court of appeals held that the district court "clearly erred" in de-
termining that its local rules of professional conduct, the Texas Rules, solely gov-
erned the motion to disqualify Stephen Susman. 221 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that
"[m]otions to disqualify are substantive motions affecting the rights of the parties
and are determined by applying standards developed under federal law."222 The
court further stated that a motion to disqualify counsel is "governed by the ethical
rules announced by the national profession in the light of the public interest and the
litigants' rights., 223 However, the court noted that while the rules announced by the
213. Red Eagle Resources, 1992 WL 170614, at *3.
214. Id. "Had this Court intended other guidelines -the [American Bar Association] Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, for example-to be considered in deciding motions to disqualify, it could have so stated in
the Local Rules, as the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas has done." Id.
215. Rule 1.06(b) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct states:
In other situations and except to the extent permitted by paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a
person if the representation of that person:
(1) involves a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially and directly
adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm; or
(2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer's or law firm's responsibili-
ties to another client or to a third person or by the lawyer's or law firm's own interests.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.06(b) (1994).
216. Red Eagle Resources, 1992 WL 170614, at *3.
217. Id. at *4.
218. Id. at *5.
219. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981).
220. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540,541 (5th Cir. 1992). The court of appeals noted that mandamus
is appropriate"'when the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has declined to exercise it, or when the trial
court has so clearly and indisputably abused its discretion as to compel prompt intervention by the appellate
court.'" Id. at 543 (quoting In re Chesson, 897 F.2d 156, 159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
221. Id.
222. Id. A district court can adopt "rules for the conduct of [its] business." 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988). The
court of appeals pointed out that the district court's local rules only identify conduct subject to sanctions and can-
not alone govern the parties' rights to choose their own counsel. Dresser Indus. , 972 F. 2d at 543.
223. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 543 (citing Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir.
1976)).
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national profession are useful in deciding motions to disqualify, they do not control
the decision.224
Faced with its first case involving concurrent representation, the Fifth Circuit
considered the matter under the Woods v. Covington County Bank22 framework.226
Citing Model Rule 1.7227 and Ethical Considerations 5-2228 and 5-19,229 the court
concluded that the American Bar Association standards "unquestionably" forbid
an attorney from bringing an action against a current client without the consent of
all involved parties. 23" However, the court pointed out that under the Woods frame-
work, exceptional circumstances might exist which would permit an attorney to
continue the concurrent representation.231 Since no exceptional circumstances ex-
isted in this case, Stephen Susman and Susman Godfrey were disqualified from
representing the plaintiffs in the class action.232
224. Id. at 544.
225. 537 F2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). The Woods Court held that standards announced by the legal profession
carry great weight in determining motions to disqualify counsel, but social interests such as the parties' right to
the counsel of their choice should also be considered. Id. at 810.
226. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 544.
227. See supra note 30.
228. Ethical Consideration 5-2 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
A lawyer should not accept proffered employment if his personal interests or desires will, or there is a
reasonable probability that they will, affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be rendered the
prospective client. After accepting employment, a lawyer carefully should refrain from acquiring a prop-
erty right or assuming a position that would tend to make his judgment less protective of the interests of
his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-2 (1980).
229. Ethical Consideration 5-19 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
A lawyer may represent several clients whose interests are not actually or potentially differing. Never-
theless, he should explain any circumstances that might cause a client to question his undivided loyalty.
Regardless of the belief of a lawyer that he may properly represent multiple clients, he must defer to a
client who holds the contrary belief and withdraw from representation of that client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-19 (1980).
230. DresserIndus., 972 F.2d at 544-45. The court also noted that the same position is taken by the ABA/BNA
Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct and the draft of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. Id. at
544-45 n.9. The ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual states:
A lawyer may not represent one client whose interests are adverse to those of another current client of
the lawyer's, even if the two representations are unrelated, unless the clients consent and the lawyer be-
lieves he or she is able to represent each client without adversely affecting the other. Courts and ethics
panels generally take a broad view of this restriction, and a specific adverse effect probably will not have
to be shown. All that need be present is that one lawyer or firm is representing two clients, even in unre-
lated matters, with potentially conflicting interests.
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 51: l01 (Supp. 1990).
The Restatement states:
A lawyer's representation of Client A may require the lawyer to file a lawsuit against Client B whom the
lawyer represents in an unrelated matter. It might seem that no conflict of interest is presented in such a
case if Client B is represented in Client A's suit by a lawyer unaffiliated with the lawyer for Client A
.... However, the lawyer has a duty of loyalty to the client being sued, and the client on whose behalf
suit is filed might fear that the lawyer would pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the
other client. . . . Because what is at stake in such cases is the lawyer's loyalty, the rule should be applied
so as to minimize the impact on the choice of counsel by the affected clients.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 209 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991).
23 1. Dresser Indus. , 972 F.2d at 545. For example, the court noted that an attorney might be permitted to con-
tinue concurrent representation if he could show "some social interest to be served by his representation that
would outweigh the public perception of his impropriety." Id.
232. Id. at 546.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Substantive Law of Simultaneous Representation
In most situations, it seems clear that clients can consent to adverse representa-
tion. 3 Absent consent, problems arise in defining "directly adverse"234 interests.
The Comment to Model Rule 1.7 notes that "simultaneous representation in un-
related matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such as com-
peting economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients."2 35
While questions may arise as to whether some types of representations are gener-
ally or directly adverse, there can be no doubt that bringing a suit against a present
client on behalf of another client constitutes representation of interests that are di-
rectly adverse.2 36 As the Dresser Court recognized, "[u]nquestionably, the na-
tional standards of attorney conduct forbid a lawyer from bringing a suit against a
current client without the consent of both clients."237
Some federal courts, however, have refused to disqualify law firms when they
file suit against present clients .23' Although the American Bar Association's ethi-
cal standards are not binding on courts,239 no court should allow a law firm to sue a
present client. Notwithstanding the potential for misuse of client confidences, a
lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client forbids adverse representation. 240 In the often-
quoted words of the Connecticut Supreme Court, "[w]hen a client engages the ser-
vices of a lawyer in a given piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that
business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the
one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his champion. 241
The Dresser Court noted that "exceptional circumstances" may exist which
would allow a lawyer to simultaneously represent adverse interests.242 For exam
ple, a lawyer might avoid disqualification if he can show "some social interest to be
served by his representation that would outweigh the public perception of his im-
propriety. "243
As the federal case law survey illustrates, most courts disqualify lawyers who
sue present clients. What facts call for an exception to the prohibition is uncertain.
233. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui
Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990). But see Guthrie Aircraft, Inc. v. Genesee Co.,
597 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that a municipality cannot consent to adverse representation
because the public interest is involved).
234. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
235. Id. at cmt.
236. In re Dresser Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 1992).
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Tipton v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 872 F.2d 1491 (1 1th Cir. 1989); SWS Fin.
Fund A v. Salomon Bros., 790 F. Supp. 1392 (E. D. Ill. 1992); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 721 F Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
239. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 542.
240. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1983).
241. Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964).
242. Dresser Indus., 972 F2d at 545.
243. Id.
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When faced with a disqualification motion, courts should analyze the problem in
light of the predominant purpose behind the rule: ensuring that the attorney's duty
of loyalty to the client remains paramount. 2 Clearly, when a lawyer sues a present
client, loyalty is trampled upon, leaving the client with a less than favorable per-
ception of the legal profession.
B. The Law Governing Motions to Disqualify
In Dresser, the district court's local rules adopted the Texas Disciplinary Rules
of Professional Conduct as the district's ethical standards.24 When a district court
adopts the state bar's code of ethics as its rules of conduct, many problems can
arise if the state code of ethics differs from the American Bar Association stand-
ards. To illustrate these possible problems, consider the following hypothetical.
The XYZ law firm, located in Portland, Oregon, represents Pepsico in litigation
pending in Oregon state court. The firm is later retained by client A to sue Pizza
Hut, a subsidiary of Pepsico,246 in California state court. Pizza Hut then removes
the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
The district court's local rules adopt the California Rules of Professional Conduct
as the district's code of ethics. Under the California Rules, there is no conflict of
interest when a law firm sues the subsidiary of a client.247 However, there is no
similar provision in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The conflict in this hypothetical is obvious. If the district court follows the
California rules, 2" the result will likely be different than a district court in another
state. 249 Furthermore, if the district court applies the California rules and finds no
conflict, how should the Ninth Circuit treat the decision on appeal? If affirmed,
how will this affect other district courts in the Ninth Circuit which adopt Ameri-
can Bar Association standards as their code of ethics?
As the many federal district courts adopt their own code of ethics, the possibil-
ity of different ethical standards in different regions of the country becomes wor-
thy of concern. In effect, a law firm with a possible conflict of interest could forum
shop for a district court with more liberal conflict rules and file suit there, rather
than file with a district court whose local rules adopt the American Bar Associa-
tion standards. The solution lies in placing the various ethical codes in the
244. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1983).
245. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 541.
246. See Gesing v. Pizza Hut of Am., No. CIV.A.85-0128, 1986 WL 4468 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 1986) (mem.).
247. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 820 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 n. I (N.D. Cal. 1993)
("Parent and subsidiary corporations are separate entities, therefore, representation of a wholly owned subsidi-
ary, let alone a separately incorporated subsidiary, does not create a conflict of interest.") (citing State Bar of Cali-
fornia Standing Comm. on Professional Responsiblity and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113).
248. See id. at 1215 (order disqualifying counsel) ("[Tihis court must apply California Rules of Professional
Responsibility, including California case law. .. ").
249. See Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l N.V., 756 F Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The duty [of
loyalty] applies with equal force where the client is a subsidiary of the entity to be sued."); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui
Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (law firm's representation of subsidiary, while
suing parent, created conflict of interest and required withdrawal from one representation).
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perspective for which they were designed: a framework for the ethical practice of
law and not as rules of decision in disqualification motions.2"' Thus, a disqualifi-
cation motion should be governed by a federal common law of ethics with the ethi-
cal codes serving as guides. As the Fifth Circuit stated: "Federal courts may adopt
state or [American Bar Association] rules as their ethical standards, but whether
and how these rules are to be applied are questions of federal law.
251
Looking back to the hypothetical, how should the district court decide a motion
to disqualify the XYZ law firm? Rather than look to California state law, 25 2 the
court should rely on other federal decisions regarding a similar conflict of interest
problem. 23 Arguably, this route will produce a more uniform body of federal eth-
ics law and reduce the different ethical standards in the district courts.
254
C. Appealability of a Motion to Disqualify Counsel
Because the Supreme Court has held that orders granting or denying disqualifi-
cation motions are not appealable as collateral orders,255 the losing party can ob-
tain immediate review only through the certification process of § 1292(b) 256 or a
writ of mandamus. To obtain a writ of mandamus, the party must satisfy a two-
pronged test: (1) there must be no other adequate means of obtaining relief, and
(2) the party must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to the writ.257
The problem with employing mandamus to review a district court's disqualifi-
cation order lies in the first prong of the test (no other adequate means of relief). If
the disqualification order can be effectively reviewed on appeal after final judg-
ment, then there are other adequate means of relief.
The conflicting views on whether a disqualification order can be effectively re-
viewed on appeal after final judgment boil down to a single, unanswered question:
Must a party losing a disqualification motion show prejudice-i.e., a different
outcome with a different set of lawyers? Showing prejudice on appeal would be
250. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope (1983); John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vuinerable Is the
Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497, 515 (1979) (reporter for American Bar Association
committee which wrote the Code states that Code was not intended to govern disqualification motions); cf J.P.
Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring) ("[A] court need not
treat the Canons of Professional Responsibility as it would a statute that we have no right to amend.").
251. In re American Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605,610 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993);
cf In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634,645 n.6 (1985) ("[T]he [ethical] standards imposed are a matter of federal law.").
252. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1407, 1413-14 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("A
federal court is not bound to enforce New York's view of what constitutes ethical professional conduct.").
253. See Atasi Corp. v. Seagate Technology, 847 F.2d 826, 830 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (California rules did not pro-
vide for imputed disqualification of law firm, but court relied on Model Code "as applied in court decisions" to
disqualify firm).
254. Of course, this means that California state courts will have different ethical standards than the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California.
255. See Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424 (1985); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259
(1984); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
256. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
257. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1980).
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almost impossible.258 The Supreme Court, however, stated that it had never re-
quired prejudice to reverse a final judgment following an erroneous disqualifica-
tion, but had left the question open.25 9 If a showing of prejudice is not required,
then the final judgment could be reversed even though the erroneous disqualifica-
tion order did not affect the outcome of the trial .260
Putting aside the prejudice question which remains unanswered with no satis-
factory solution, the standard of review which should be applied to a district
court's ruling on a disqualification motion on appeal via a petition for mandamus
varies from circuit to circuit. In Dresser, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district
court's decision de novo because "district courts enjoy no particular advantage
over appellate courts in formulating ethical rules to govern motions to disqual-
ify."261
Rather than reviewing disqualification orders de novo in a mandamus petition,
the better approach is that taken by the Seventh Circuit -the order must be "pat-
ently erroneous."282 Unlike de novo review, the "patently erroneous" standard sets
a higher threshold of error, thus comporting with the Supreme Court's mandamus
formulation: "Although a simple showing of error may suffice to obtain a reversal
on direct appeal, to issue a writ of mandamus under such circumstances 'would
undermine the settled limitations upon the power of an appellate court to review
interlocutory orders.'- 263 Furthermore, as the Seventh Circuit noted, reviewing a
disqualification decision de novo through a petition for mandamus "provide[s] a
route of appellate review functionally identical to the direct appeal of disqualifica-
tion orders."26
VI. CONCLUSION
In Dresser, the Fifth Circuit faced its first case involving simultaneous repre-
sentation of adverse interests. Unlike some other circuits, the Fifth Circuit une-
quivocally stated that absent "exceptional circumstances," a lawyer or law firm
258. As the Seventh Circuit stated:
Impossible at least if the party obtained a competent substitute for the disqualified lawyer-and if not
he has only himself to blame, save in the extraordinary situation in which only one lawyer is competent to
represent the party, a situation generally confined to the rare case of disqualification on the eve of trial
coupled with a refusal to grant a continuance.
In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118, 1119 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Koller, 472 U.S. at 443 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
believe it would be virtually impossible to demonstrate that an outcome has been affected by the change of coun-
sel as opposed to the other myriad variables present in civil litigation.").
259. Koller, 472 U.S. at 438.
260. Sandahl, 980 F.2d at 1119. But see Koller, 472 U.S. at 443 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Aifter a trial with
substitute counsel has been held, I would be most reluctant to subscribe to a rule requiring reversal without a
showing of some impact on the outcome.").
261. In re Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 540, 543 (citing Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
262. SeeSandahl, 980F.2dat 1121.
263. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1981) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S.
90, 98 n.6 (1967)).
264. Sandahl, 980 F2d at 1121.
265. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d at 542.
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who sues a present client without consent should be disqualified.266 Additionally,
the court approached a federal common law of ethics by applying "standards de-
veloped under federal law," rather than the district court's local rules, to the dis-
qualification motion.267
The federal substantive law of simultaneous representation of adverse interests,
the law governing disqualification motions, and the appealability of disqualifica-
tion orders via mandamus are far from uniform in the federal courts. The Fifth
Circuit in Dresser has, for now, firmly spoken.
266. id. at 545.
267. Id. at 543.
